What Is a Christian Culture? Two Essays by T. S. Eliot

Meliora

T. S. Eliot is known to most people today primarily for his poetry, in particular, “The Waste Land,” “Four Quartets,” and “Ash Wednesday.” His plays too still have a purchase on our literary consciousness: Murder in the Cathedral and The Cocktail Party. His essays, however, seem to languish in their shadow, despite the fact that most of his later career was distinguished for his literary and cultural criticism.

The productions of his early career, in particular—when he was considered, by himself and others, as a modernist—were characterized by all the things modernism was famous for: intentional difficulty, ambiguity, experimentation, and the promiscuous use of symbolism, as well as a general disruption of conventional literary forms. Anyone reading “The Waste Land” unprepared will understand the full scope of the mischievousness of modernism’s style (if “style” is really the right word).

Eliot’s later prose work, however, is anything but obscure. Some readers today might find it slightly stilted, as they would, we should admit, most intellectual prose of the time. Still, his essays commenting on important cultural and literary issues are clear, well-reasoned, and insightful. Eliot’s extended essays Christianity and Culture and Notes Towards the Definition of Culture are the perfect examples of the lucidity of his prose and the clarity of his thought. They are also an indication of how far he had come from his early modernist days toward a Christian conception of culture.

Christianity and Culture

Christianity and Culture, Eliot says, is a “preface to the problem of Church and State.” He states first that the terms under which the current discussion on political matters is conducted are unsatisfactory.

The point of departure for his analysis of culture consists of a few uncomfortable observations about our culture as it is:

By destroying traditional social habits of the people, by dissolving their natural collective consciousness into individual constituents, by licensing the opinions of the most foolish, by substituting instruction for education, by encouraging cleverness rather than wisdom, the upstart rather than the qualified, by fostering a notion of getting on to which the alternative is a hopeless apathy, Liberalism can prepare the way for that which is its own negation: the artificial, mechanised or brutalised control which is a desperate remedy for its chaos.

Liberalism, by itself, despite the rhetoric of many of its advocates, does in no way ensure its own survival. In fact, it leads to its own demise: “Out of Liberalism itself come philosophies which deny it.”

Although he mentions “Liberalism” in this indictment (liberalism in its most generic form), he does not ignore conservatism, commenting on the extremes that can be taken in the two polarities of liberty and order:

In the sense in which Liberalism is contrasted with Conservatism, both can be equally repellant: if the former can mean chaos, the latter can mean petrifaction. We are always faced both with the question “what must be destroyed?” and with the question “what must be preserved?” and neither Liberalism nor Conservatism, which are not philosophies and may be merely habits, is enough to guide us.

The ideas behind liberalism and democracy, thinks Eliot, result in a cultural vacuum and lead inevitably to a kind of pagan totalitarianism—unless it first escapes to the daylight of a Christian society.

If, then, Liberalism disappears from the philosophy of life of a people, what positive is left? We are left only with the term “democracy,” a term which, for the present generation, still has a Liberal connotation of “freedom.” But totalitarianism can retain the terms “freedom” and “democracy” and give them its own meaning.

And besides, he insists, the live option we really face is not between liberalism and conservatism. “I believe,” he said, “that the choice before us is between the formation of a new Christian culture, and the acceptance of a pagan one.”

In his accompanying work Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (examined in more detail in the next section), Eliot discusses his opinion that culture and religion are two different sides of the same coin. On the one hand, culture comes into being and maintains itself on the basis of religion. On the other hand, what is part of our culture is also a part of our lived religion. Culture and religion are not the same thing, yet they cannot be completely separated one from another. And the culture of the people is the incarnation of their religion.

Eliot spends a good deal of time enumerating the organization of a Christian society. One important feature of such a society—and one that helps distinguish it from a theocracy—is not that it should include Christians exclusively, or that it should be one in which a non-Christian would be at a disadvantage, but simply that it operates on Christian presuppositions.

A Christian will desire a Christian society. But he is not the only one who will. A non-Christian will desire it as well—if he is made fully conscious of the ramifications of a secular society, ramifications which would be undesirable even to the secularist. “If you will not have God (and He is a jealous God) you should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin,” says Eliot.

One of the goals of such a society would be the maintenance of the conditions in which the virtuous life could be pursued unhindered. A necessary element contributing to this end is an educational system that provides all citizens with a common set of values and criteria. The Christian society will require Christian education, an education that does not necessarily “make men and women pious Christians.” This, he argues, would produce obscurantism (and is probably not even possible anyway). It would, rather, create a system of basic Christian assumptions that are shared:

A Christian education would primarily train people to be able to think in Christian categories, though it could not compel belief and would not impose the necessity for insincere profession of belief. What the rulers believed, would be less important than the beliefs to which they would be obliged to conform.

These commonly shared assumptions will act to unify the educational disciplines and create a common cultural ground upon which important matters of law and society can be intelligently discussed at all. If such values and criteria are not diffused among the citizenry, cultural power devolves to those holding political power, who may not themselves be adherents of a virtuous philosophy of life. Christianity, in a cultural context, is not religious in the conventional sense. It must incarnate itself in a social way.

However bigoted the announcement may sound, the Christian can be satisfied with nothing less than a Christian organisation of society—which is not the same thing as a society consisting exclusively of devout Christians. It would be a society in which the natural end of man—virtue and well-being in community—is acknowledged for all, and the supernatural end—beatitude—for those who have the eyes to see it.

Eliot’s culture differs from our own in a significant way. His culture was a Christian culture in dissolution, and therefore the need was for a reenergizing of forces that were still present. And the personal acceptance of Christian assumptions is not sufficient:

The rulers … will, qua rulers, accept Christianity not simply as their own faith to guide their actions, but as the system under which they are to govern.

It is worth noting in this context that our own is a very different age, one in which the need is not for a reenergizing of what is still there, but for a resurrection of something that has become culturally moribund. Different tactical options have been proposed for the direction of this project, mostly along one or more of the lines of several possibilities proposed by Richard Niebuhr in his 1951 book Christ and Culture:

  • “Christ Against Culture,” in which Christians maintain separation between themselves and an evil and unredeemable culture (e.g., Tertullian, Tolstoy, and the “Benedict Option”);
  • “Christ of Culture,” in which Christians accept the fundamental moral assumptions of the culture (e.g., Gnosticism, liberal Protestantism);
  • “Christ Above Culture,” in which Christianity is thought of as transcending culture through the ultimate harmonization of reason and faith under Divine authority (e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Catholicism);
  • “Christ and Culture in Paradox,” in which the Church and culture coexist separately, but in an unresolvable cultural tension (e.g., Luther, Kierkegaard); and
  • “Christ the Transformer of Culture,” a program which calls on Christians to remain in the world and to convert the culture from paganism or secularism to Christianity (Reformed Protestantism)—the option championed by Niebuhr himself.

In 1984, Niebuhr’s thesis came under the scrutiny of Richard John Neuhaus in his book The Naked Public Square and in the periodical he later founded and edited until his death in 2009: First Things. In a 2007 essay in First Things, he proposed the addition of a sixth category of Christian cultural engagement: “Christ without culture.” This, he said, was now the primary relation between religion and culture, at least in America:

What then do I mean by suggesting this sixth type, Christ without culture? I mean that the Church—and here Church is broadly defined as the Christian movement through time—can at times adopt a way of being in the world that is deliberately indifferent to the culture of which it is part. In the “Christ without culture” model, that indifference results in the Church unconsciously adopting and thereby reinforcing, in the name of the gospel, patterns of culture that are incompatible with her gospel.

We might say that the relation between Christianity and culture as it exists today is best described, not quite as opposition, or separation, or acceptance, or coexistence, but as something more like Niebuhr’s simple indifference.

In Eliot’s time, these distinctions would have been harder to make, partly because the process of secularization was not nearly so advanced as it has become, and partly owing to the fact that Britain maintained (and still does) an established state church. If we had to apply them, we might have to conclude that the culture of Eliot’s time was somewhere between Christ Above Culture and Christ and Culture in Paradox.

Unlike Eliot’s native America (he was an American expatriate living and working in Britain), where the issue of the separation of church and state generates a much greater amount of interest and discussion, Eliot himself discusses it very little, an indication of how unimportant (particularly in a British context) the issue is to him. All he says about the actual relation of church and state is that they should remain distinct and have some coherent relationship to each other. The Church, he says, must be organized so that its roots go deep in the national and regional life so that its autonomy remains secure. The Church must command the primary loyalty of the citizenry and must recognize the dependence of politics on ethics and ethics on religion, but the Church itself, he remarks, is only one element in a Christian society.

Notes Towards the Definition of Culture

In Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, often published under the same cover as Christianity and Culture, Eliot turns his attention to culture specifically, and attempts to establish what the essential conditions for the growth and survival of culture are. We cannot, he says, after determining what these conditions are, attempt to bring them about for the sake of culture, since culture is not something which can be consciously aimed at. It is the product of various harmonious activities, each pursued for its own sake. All we can hope to do is recognize that these conditions are natural to mankind and combat the intellectual and emotional prejudices that stand in their way.

The word “culture,” he insists, can be used in one of three ways: in terms of the individual, the group, or the society as a whole. The culture of the individual, he says, is dependent upon that of the group, and that of the group upon society as a whole. There are also several kinds of attainment we have in mind when we use the word “urbanity,” “civility,” “learning,” “philosophical attainment,” and “artistic achievement.” Yet no achievement in any one of these things can establish a man as a cultured person. No individual, in fact, is a wholly cultured person. Culture, in its correct sense, can only be found in the pattern of a society. Culture is a “way of life.”

The conditions he considers essential for a culture worth having are, first, a society structured by social class. If a class system breaks down (or, for that matter, is absent from the beginning), there will result instead the formation of groups of elites. Eliot distinguishes between a class system and a system of elites.

A class system, he says, is a system in which certain specified groups “are more honoured than others.” A class has a function as that part of the society that maintains “a particular level of culture” that is “to the benefit, not merely of the class which maintains it, but of the society as a whole.” A class system, which is multi-layered, is largely distinguished by its reliance on coherence and continuity on family structures. An essential element in a class is the family, which is the primary conduit, he maintains, for the transmission of culture.

An elite, on the other hand, part of the motivation for which is the intolerance for the class system, is distinguished by its reliance on individual talent and competency. The only social distinction in the system of elites is that “between elites and the rest of the community.”

The distinctions among classes are made on the basis of “nominal education” or “birth or consanguinity,” whereas the distinction between elites and non-elites (the one, major distinction) is based on wealth, expertise, and societal interconnectedness. Eliot does not mention it, but we would be well within the spirit of his critique to add celebrity status to his list of elite distinctives.

Another condition that distinguishes a class system and elite status would be the stable, organic interconnection characteristic of the class system, something lacking among elites: “The doctrine of elites … posits an atomic view of society.” The replacement of a class system with one headed by elites has a disintegrative influence on the larger society.

The second condition for culture is the matter of divergent loyalties: those toward the nation as well as those toward region and family. Family, class, and local loyalties all support each other, he says, and the decay of any one will detrimentally affect the others. Loyalties to regional cultures promote those regional cultures which in turn enrich the national and global cultures.

The third factor is Eliot’s consideration of the sort of dialectical tension between culture and religion when viewing culture from a sociological standpoint. From this standpoint culture and religion are two sides of the same coin. He argues, on the one hand, that diversity of religion is good for the coherence of a culture, and, on the other, that unity is also necessary. Religion and culture must be unconsciously united, but subconsciously separated, and “the meaning of the terms ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ is of course altered between these two levels.”

We may here define the religious point of view, as that from which we ask the question, whether the tents of a religion are true or false. It follows that we shall be taking the religious point of view, if we are atheists whose thinking is based on the assumption that all religions are untrue. From the sociological point of view, the truth or falsity is irrelevant: we are concerned only with the comparative effects of different religious structures upon culture.

The high view of a class system expressed in Notes is not likely to go down well with Americans, who fashion themselves egalitarians. The class system clashes with the whole tenor of democratic and liberal belief as they are conceived by many people, and certainly many Americans. Eliot goes further and expresses doubt that democracy—a political view that, according to its own definition, does not play cultural favorites—can bear the cultural weight that has been placed on it, or that it can mount a coherent defense of itself against totalitarianism. But the argument against Eliot’s position on a class system will need to take account of his important distinction between class and elite status. Eliot points out that a class system is based on family. By the term “elite,” he surely has in mind a system in which cultural power is apportioned on the basis of economic or political status. He doesn’t press his case, but he could certainly argue persuasively that there is no obvious advantage in having a system in which power is apportioned according to economic and political influence rather than one in which the family is the determinant. What is the advantage of being controlled by economic and political interests over familial ones? The answer is at least not self-evident.

In the last two chapters of Notes, Eliot briefly explores the role of politics and education, respectively, in the framework of culture. Political thinking (politics being the art of the possible, in Otto von Bismarck’s famous expression) has taken on too much power for itself in modern society. Political consciousness has its place in the whole cultural scheme, but modern political theory has taken upon itself the role of “queen of the [social] sciences” to such an extent that it invites us to judge every other discipline by its political utility—even culture itself, which, rather than being a thing that can be manipulated by the state, is the unconscious background on which all theory, including political theory, operates. In regard to education, Eliot comments that the dogma of equal opportunity is the most influential dogma of any expressed by thinkers concerned with the philosophy of education. However, he says, this idea is one which arises only out of the ruins of a healthy culture. It is only a relevant idea when the class system, informed by the institution of the family, has disintegrated. Likewise the idea that education is the primary conduit of culture: This too is an idea which is merely a symptom of an unhealthy culture.

Neither of these books is a handbook, and, in fact, the kind of books they are constitute a diagnosis, not a prescription. If one can diagnose today’s culture, then it would seem that one of the chief symptoms of whatever disease it has is that it searches for the prescription before it has properly diagnosed its ailment. According to Christianity and Culture, “What we are seeking is not a programme for a party, but a way of life for a people.”

Eliot’s Notes seems to imply that his analysis (and any analysis worth pursuing on culture) is an exercise in contemplation rather than a call to action. He cautions that we cannot, by direct action, aim at the “culture” in order to effectively improve or fix it. It can only be positively affected by improving the specific things that constitute it: religion, education, art, and social structure. And he invites the question of how realistic such a revitalization would be. To revivify our culture, we must revivify religion, redirect our misdirected schools, reorient the purpose of art, and create a class system from whole cloth. This is, of course, a tall order, and Eliot gives us no practical direction on how this could be done. But it is no less a service that he identifies what it is that actually must be done. Healthy cultures have arisen before, so we must conclude that they can arise again. Outlining the difficulty of a cultural task makes the accomplishment of that task just a little bit less impossible.

Eliot’s cultural essays are not the kind of thing we seem to want, but they are certainly the kind of thing we need.

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